Analytic Philosophy

Shopping on line can be easy, simple and save you lots of money. It can also take a lot of your time, frustrate you, and result in unwanted purchases. Now the same can be said for regular high street shopping, but with the vast opportunity presented by the Internet it will pay you to spend a few minutes reading this and understanding how to better optimize your Analytic Philosophy shopping experience:

1. Compare - without doubt the biggest advantage that the Analytic Philosophy offers shoppers today is the ability to compare thousands of Analytic Philosophy at a time. This is a great thing, but not necessarily all the time! Too much can be daunting at times so take advantage of the great comparison sites and where possible let them do the hard work for you.

2. Research - if it has been said it will be on the internet. Ignorance is no longer a justifiable reason for buying the wrong thing. Take the time to research in detail everything that you could possible want to know about

3. Testimonials - don't know anybody that has bought a Analytic Philosophy? Wrong! If the Analytic Philosophy is good the internet will let you know. Use the Internet as a friend and get testimonials before you buy.

4. Questions - Got a question about Analytic Philosophy then search the Forums, FAQ's, Blogs etc. Don't be afraid to ask .....

5. Reputation - Never heard of the company selling Analytic Philosophy? Don't worry, no reason why you should know every company in the world, but you know someone that does! Use the internet to find out what people are saying about Analytic Philosophy and build up a picture of their reputation for sales, returns, customer service, delivery etc.

6. Returns - still worried that even after all of the above your Analytic Philosophy wont be what you want? Check out the returns policy. There is so much competition now that someone, somewhere is bound to offer the terms that you are comfortable with.

7. Feedback - happy with your Analytic Philosophy then let people know, after all you are depending on others people input in your buying decision, so why not give a little back.

8. Security - check for the yellow padlock on the Analytic Philosophy site before you buy, and the s after http:/ /i.e. https:// = a secure site

9. Contact - got a question about Analytic Philosophy, or want to leave a comment then check out the sites contact page. Reputable companies have them and respond.

10. Payment - ready to pay for your Analytic Philosophy, then use your credit card or PayPal! Be aware of companies that don't accept them, there may be genuine reasons but given the huge amount of choice you have when buying online there is no reason at all not to buy via credit card or PayPal.

Analytic philosophy (sometimes, analytical philosophy) is a generic term for a style of philosophy that came to dominate English-speaking countries in the 20th century. In the United States the overwhelming majority of university philosophy departments self-identify as "analytic" departments.See, e.g., , where Brian Leiter notes: "All the Ivy League universities, all the leading state research universities, all the University of California campuses, most of the top liberal arts colleges, most of the flagship campuses of the second-tier state research universities boast philosophy departments that overwhelmingly self-identify as "analytic": it is hard to imagine a "movement" that is more academically and professionally entrenched than analytic philosophy." See also John Searle's judgment (in Bunnin & Tsui-James (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Philosophy (Blackwell, 2003), p. 1): "Without exception, the best philosophy departments in the United States are dominated by analytic philosophy, and among the leading philosophers in the United States, all but a tiny handful would be classified as analytic philosophers." (This situation is mirrored in the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia.)

Given this scope, it is difficult to identify non-trivial philosophical claims that would be common to all analytic philosophy. The term "analytic philosophy" may mark merely a family resemblance across disparate philosophical views, or historical lines of influence.See, e.g., Avrum Stroll, Twentieth-Century Analytic Philosophy (Columbia University Press, 2000), p. 5: "t is difficult to give a precise definition of 'analytic philosophy' since it is not so much a specific doctrine as a loose concatenation of approaches to problems." Also, see ibid., p. 7: "I think Sluga is right in saying 'it may be hopeless to try to determine the essence of analytic philosophy.' Nearly every proposed definition has been challenged by some scholar. e are dealing with a family resemblance concept." Insofar as broad generalizations can be made, analytic philosophy is defined by its emphasis on clarity and argument, often achieved via modern formal logic and analysis of language, and a respect for the natural sciences.H. Glock, "Was Wittgenstein an Analytic Philosopher?", Metaphilosophy, 35:4 (2004), pp. 419-444.

The historical roots of analytic philosophy can be summarily characterised thus:

First, the logical positivism view that there are no specifically philosophical truths and that the object of philosophy is the logical clarification of thoughts. This contrasts with the traditional foundationalism, deriving from Aristotle, that views philosophy as a special sort of science, the highest one, which investigates the fundamental reasons and principles of everything.See Aristotle Metaphysics (Book II 993a), Kenny (1973) p. 230. As a result, analytic philosophers have often considered their inquiries as continuous with, or subordinate to, those of the natural sciences.This is an attitude that goes back to John Locke, who described his work as that of an "underlabourer" to the achievements of natural scientists such as Newton. In the twentieth century, the most influential advocate of the continuity of philosophy with science was Willard Van Orman Quine: see, e.g., his papers "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" and "Epistemology Naturalized".

Second, the view that the logical clarification of thoughts can only be achieved by analysis of the logical form of philosophical propositions.A.P. Martinich, "Introduction," in Martinich & D. Sosa (eds.), A Companion to Analytic Philosophy (Blackwell, 2001), p. 1: "To use a general name for the kind of analytic philosophy practiced during the first half of the twentieth century, 'conceptual analysis' aims at breaking down complex concepts into their simpler components." The logical form of a proposition is a way of representing it (often using the formal grammar and symbolism of a logical system) to display its similarity with all other propositions of the same type. However, analytic philosophers disagree widely about the correct logical form of ordinary language.Wittgenstein, op. cit., 4.111

Third, a rejection of sweeping philosophical systems in favour of close attention to detail.Scott Soames, Philosophical Analysis in the Twentieth Century Vol. 1 (Princeton UP, 2003), p. xv: "There is, I think, a widespread presumption within the tradition that it is often possible to make philosophical progress by intensively investigating a small, circumscribed range of philosophical issues while holding broader, systematic questions in abeyance. What distinguishes twentieth-century analytical philosophy from at least some philosophy in other traditions, or at other times, is not a categorical rejection of philosophical systems, but rather the acceptance of a wealth of smaller, more thorough and more rigorous, investigations that need not be tied to any overarching philosophical view." See also, e.g., "Philosophical Analysis" (catalogued under "Analysis, Philosophical") in Encyclopedia of Philosophy , Vol. 1 (Macmillan, 1967), esp. sections on "Bertrand Russell" at p. 97ff, "G.E. Moore" at p. 100ff, and "Logical Positivism" at p. 102ff. Among some (but by no means all) analytic philosophers, this rejection of "grand theory" has taken the form of a defence of common sense and ordinary language against the pretensions of metaphysicians.See, e.g., the works of G.E. Moore and J.L. Austin.

History In the early 20th century, the England philosophers Bertrand Russell and G. E. Moore used conceptual analysis to criticize then-dominant forms of Hegelianism, rejecting its idealism and purported obscurity.See for example Moore's A Defence of Common Sense and Russell's critique of the Doctrine of internal relations"…analytic philosophy opposed right from its beginning English neo-hegelianism of Bradley's sort and similar ones. It did not only criticize the latter's denial of the existence of an external world (anyway an unjust criticism), but also the bombastic, obscure style of Hegel's writings." Peter Jonkers, "Perspectives on twentieth century philosophy: A Reply to Tom Rockmore," Their approach was reinforced by the movement of positivist-inclined continental philosophers into English-speaking countries in the first half of the century.Prominent amongst these were Ludwig Wittgenstein and Rudolf Carnap. Karl Popper might also be included, since despite his rejection of the label his method bears many of the hallmarks of the analytic tradition. Post-World War II analytic philosophy subsequently took various paths, including a rejection of formal analysis in favour of a close examination of natural language,The later Wittgenstein was accompanied on this path by many contemporaries, including J. L. Austin inquiry into the logical underpinnings of languagesWillard Van Orman Quine and Donald Davidson (philosopher) and renewed interest in the ethical implications of analytic method.Many deserve mention here, including the influence of R. M. Hare and Philippa Foot.

The prominence of logic Gottlob Frege and Edmund Husserl were key figures in early twentieth century philosophy of mathematics. Husserl's Philosophy of Arithmetic, inspired by the teachings of Karl Weierstrass, attempted to show that the concept of the cardinal number, derived from psychical acts of grouping objects and counting them, was the foundation of arithmetic. Husserl's approach was strongly condemned as psychologism in a review by Frege, who was committed to the view that mathematics and logic have their own validity, independent of the judgments or mental states of individual mathematicians and logicians. Frege's own work, the Begriffsschrift, developed the concepts of a specific form of modern logic by making use of the notions of the sense and reference. Frege further developed his philosophy of logic and mathematics in The Foundations of Arithmetic and The Basic Laws of Arithmetic where he provides an alternative to psychologistic accounts of the concept of number.

Bertrand Russell and Alfred North Whitehead attempted to show that mathematics is reducible to fundamental logical principles. Their Principia Mathematica (1910-1913) encouraged many philosophers to take a renewed interest in the development of symbolic logic. This contributed in turn to the evolution of logical positivism, which used formal logical tools to underpin an empiricist account of our knowledge of the world. Philosophers such as Rudolf Carnap and Hans Reichenbach, along with other members of the Vienna Circle, held that the truths of logic and mathematics were tautologies, and that tautologies, together with verifiable empirical claims, constituted the entire universe of meaningful judgments; anything else was, strictly speaking nonsense (including, for example, the claims of ethics, aesthetics and theology). Karl Popper's insistence upon the role of falsification in the philosophy of science was a reaction to the logical positivists. ISBN 0-415-27844-9

Formalism and natural languages Part of analytic approach is the clarification of philosophical problems by examining the language used to express them. Two major threads weave through this tradition: formalism and natural language.

The former seeks to understand language, and hence philosophical problems, by making use of logic. That is, in one way or another it seeks to formalize the way in which philosophical statements are made. This perspective has been taken up in a number of formulations, including Symbolic logic, which assumes the primary importance of sense and reference in the construction of meaning, as well as Kurt Gödel Gödel's incompleteness theorem, Bertrand Russell's theory of definite descriptions, Karl Popper's theory of falsificationism and Alfred Tarski's Semantic theory of truth.

A second thread seeks to understand philosophical ideas by a close and careful examination of the natural language used to express them – usually with some emphasis on the importance of common sense in dealing with difficult concepts.

These two threads intertwine, sometimes implacably opposed to each other, sometimes virtually identical. Famously, Wittgenstein started out in the formalism camp, but ended up in the natural language camp.

Formalism Logical atomism Analytic philosophy has its origins in Gottlob Frege’s development of predicate logic. This permitted a much wider range of sentences to be parsed into logical form. Bertrand Russell adopted it as his primary philosophical tool; a tool he thought could expose the underlying structure of philosophical problems. For example, the English word “is” can be parsed in three distinct ways:

in 'the cat is asleep: the is of predication says that 'x is P': P(x)
in 'there is a cat”: the is of existence says that there is an x: ∃(x)
in 'three is half of six': the is of identity says that x is the same as y: x=y

Russell sought to resolve various philosophical issues by applying such clear and clean distinctions, most famously in the case of the definite description.

The Tractatus As a young Austrian soldier, Ludwig Wittgenstein expanded and developed Russell's logical atomism into a comprehensive system in a brief book, the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. The argument therein suggests that the world is the existence of certain states of affairs and these states of affairs can be expressed in the language of first-order predicate logic. So a picture of the world can be built up by expressing atomic facts in atomic propositions, and linking them using logical operators.

One of the central movements within analytic philosophy is linked closely to the following statement from the Tractatus:

5.6 The limits of my language mean the limits of my world.

This attitude is one of the reasons for the close relationship between philosophy of language and analytic philosophy. Language, on this view is the principal—or perhaps the only—tool of the philosopher. For Wittgenstein, and many other analytic philosophers, philosophy consists in clarifying how language can be used. The hope is that when language is used clearly, philosophical problems are found to dissolve. This view has come to be known as quietism (philosophy).

Wittgenstein thought he had set out the 'final solution' to all philosophical problems, and so went off to become a school teacher. However, he later revisited the inadequacy of logical atomism, and further expanded the philosophy of language by what became his posthumous book Philosophical Investigations.

Natural language semantics Donald Davidson (philosopher). Oxford in 1970s. P. F. Strawson, Michael Dummett, John McDowell, Evans.

Natural language Reaction against idealism George Edward Moore, Common Sense philosophy. This philosophy is a rejection of British Post-Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel Idealism.

Ordinary language philosophy Main article: Ordinary language philosophy

Oxford School. Associated with such philosophers as J. L. Austin, Gilbert Ryle, Searle, and, as well, the later teachings of Wittgenstein.

Rather than viewing philosophical problems with respect to logic, ordinary language philosophy sets forth the notion of consideration with respect to the ordinary usage of the linguistic terms germane to such problems. While schools such as logical positivism focus on logical terms, supposed to be universal and separate from contingent factors (such as culture, language, historical conditions), ordinary language philosophy emphasizes the use of language by ordinary people. It may be argued, then, that ordinary language philosophy is of a more sociological grounding, as it essentially focuses on the use of language within social contexts.

Ordinary language philosophy was often used to disperse philosophical problems, by exposing them as results of fundamental misunderstandings regarding the ordinary usage of the pertinent linguistic terms. Indeed, this is apparent in Ryle (who attempted to dispose of "Ghost in the machine"), as well as Wittgenstein, among others.

Logical positivism and logical empiricism Vienna Circle, Rudolf Carnap, Verificationism. Analytic-synthetic distinction. Rejection of Metaphysics, Ethics, Aesthetics. "Emotivism."Immigration of logicians and scientists from Europe in the 1930s. Philosophy of science. W. V. Quine, who attempted to dispose of the supposed Two Dogmas of Empiricism, and especially the analytic-synthetic distinction. Behaviorism.

See the separate article on Logical Positivism for further information.

Philosophy of mind and cognitive science Paul Churchland and Patricia Churchland, Daniel Dennett. See philosophy of mind or cognitive science for further information.

Ethics in analytic philosophy As a side-effect of the focus on logic and language in the early years of analytic philosophy, the tradition initially had little to say on the subject of ethics. The attitude was widespread among early analytics that these subjects were unsystematic, and merely expressed personal attitudes about which philosophy could have little or nothing to say. Wittgenstein, in the Tractatus, remarks that values cannot be a part of the world, and if they are anything at all they must be beyond or outside the world somehow, and that hence language, which describes the world, can say nothing about them. One interpretation of these remarks found expression in the doctrine of the logical positivists that statements about Value (ethics) — including all ethical and aesthetic judgments — are, like metaphysical claims, literally meaningless and therefore non-cognitive; that is, not truth-apt to be either true or false. Social and political philosophy, aesthetics, and various more specialized subjects like philosophy of history thus moved to the fringes of English-language philosophy for some time.

By the 1950s debates had begun to arise over whether — and if so, how — ethical statements really were non-cognitive. Charles Stevenson argued for expressivism, R. M. Hare advocated a view called universal prescriptivism. Phillipa Foot contributed several essays attacking all these positions, and the collapse of logical positivism as a cohesive research programme led to a renewed interest in ethics. Perhaps most influential in this area was Elizabeth Anscombe, whose landmark monograph "Intention" was called by Donald Davidson "the most important treatment of action since Aristotle", and is widely regarded as a masterpiece of moral psychology. A favorite student and close friend of Ludwig Wittgenstein, her 1958 article "Modern Moral Philosophy" introduced the term "consequentialism" into the philosophical lexicon, declared the "is-ought" impasse to be a dead end, and led to a revival in virtue ethics.

Analytic philosophy of religion As with the study of ethics, early analytic philosophy avoided the study of philosophy of religion, dismissing the subject as part of metaphysics and meaningless. The collapse of logical positivism renewed interest in philosophy of religion, prompting philosophers such as William Alston, J. L. Mackie, Alvin Plantinga, Robert Merrihew Adams, and Antony Flew to not only introduce new problems, but to re-open classical ones, such as the nature of miracles and the arguments for and against the existence of God.Peterson, Michael et al. (2003). Reason and Religious Belief

Plantinga, Mackie and Flew debated the logical validity of the free will defense as a way to solve the problem of evil.Mackie, John L. (1982). The Miracle of Theism: Arguments For and Against the Existence of God Alston, grappling with the consequences of analytic philosophy of language, worked on the nature of religious language. Adams worked on the relationship of faith and morality.Adams, Robert M. (1987). The Virtue of Faith And Other Essays in Philosophical Theology

Analytic philosophy of religion has also been preoccupied with Ludwig Wittgenstein and his interpretation of Søren Kierkegaard's philosophy of religionCreegan, Charles. (1989). Wittgenstein and Kierkegaard: Religion, Individuality and Philosophical Method. Using first-hand remarks (which would later be published in Philosophical Investigations, Culture and Value, and other works), philosophers such as Peter Winch and Norman Malcolm developed a Fideism interpretation of Wittgenstein Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Entry on Fideism. Responding to this interpretation, Kai Nielsen and D.Z. Phillips became two of the most prominent philosophers on Wittgenstein's philosophy of religion.Nielsen, Kai and D.Z. Phillips. (2005). Wittgensteinian Fideism?

Political philosophy Current analytic political philosophy owes much to John Rawls, who, in a series of papers from the 1950s onward (most notably "Two Concepts of Rules" and "Justice as Fairness") and his 1971 book A Theory of Justice, produced a sophisticated and closely argued defence of a liberal welfare state. This was followed in short order by Rawls's colleague Robert Nozick's book Anarchy, State, and Utopia, a defence of free-market libertarianism.

Analytical Marxism Another interesting development in the area of political philosophy has been the emergence of a school known as Analytical Marxism. Members of this school seek to apply the techniques of analytic philosophy, along with tools of modern social science such as rational choice theory to the elucidation of the theories of Karl Marx and his successors. The best known member of this school, is Oxford University philosopher G.A. Cohen, whose 1978 work, Karl Marx's Theory of History: A Defence is generally taken as representing the genesis of this school. In that book, Cohen attempted to apply the tools of logical and linguistic analysis to the elucidation and defense of Marx's materialist conception of history. Other prominent Analytical Marxists include the economist John Roemer, the social scientist Jon Elster, and the sociologist Erik Olin Wright. All these people have attempted to build upon Cohen's work by bringing to bear modern social science methods, such as rational choice theory, to supplement Cohen's use of analytic philosophical techniques in the interpretation of Marxian theory.

Cohen himself would later engage directly with Rawlsian political philosophy in attempt to advance a socialist theory of justice that stands in contrast to both traditional Marxism and the theories advanced by Rawls and Nozick. In particular, he points to Marx's principle of from each according to his ability, to each according to his need.

Communitarianism Communitarians such as Alasdair MacIntyre, Charles Taylor (philosopher), Michael Walzer and Michael Sandel advance a critique of Liberalism that uses analytic techniques to isolate the key assumptions of Liberal individualists, such as Rawls, and then challenges these assumptions. In particular, Communitarians challenge the Liberal assumption that the individual can be viewed as fully autonomous from the community in which he lives and is brought up. Instead, they push for a conception of the individual that emphasizes the role that the community plays in shaping his or her values, thought processes and opinions.

See also :Category:Analytic philosophers

Further reading

The London Philosophy Study Guide offers many suggestions on what to read, depending on the student's familiarity with the subject: Frege, Russell, and Wittgenstein

External links

Analytic Philosophy; Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Conceptions of Analysis in Analytic Philosophy; Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
European Society for Analytic Philosophy

References

Aristotle, Metaphysics
Geach, P., Mental Acts, London 1957
Kenny, A.J.P., Wittgenstein, London 1973.
Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, article Analytic Philosophy.
Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus

Footnotes

Analytic philosophy (sometimes, analytical philosophy) is a generic term for a style of philosophy that came to dominate English-speaking countries in the 20th century. In the United States the overwhelming majority of university philosophy departments self-identify as "analytic" departments.See, e.g., , where Brian Leiter notes: "All the Ivy League universities, all the leading state research universities, all the University of California campuses, most of the top liberal arts colleges, most of the flagship campuses of the second-tier state research universities boast philosophy departments that overwhelmingly self-identify as "analytic": it is hard to imagine a "movement" that is more academically and professionally entrenched than analytic philosophy." See also John Searle's judgment (in Bunnin & Tsui-James (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Philosophy (Blackwell, 2003), p. 1): "Without exception, the best philosophy departments in the United States are dominated by analytic philosophy, and among the leading philosophers in the United States, all but a tiny handful would be classified as analytic philosophers." (This situation is mirrored in the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia.)

Given this scope, it is difficult to identify non-trivial philosophical claims that would be common to all analytic philosophy. The term "analytic philosophy" may mark merely a family resemblance across disparate philosophical views, or historical lines of influence.See, e.g., Avrum Stroll, Twentieth-Century Analytic Philosophy (Columbia University Press, 2000), p. 5: "t is difficult to give a precise definition of 'analytic philosophy' since it is not so much a specific doctrine as a loose concatenation of approaches to problems." Also, see ibid., p. 7: "I think Sluga is right in saying 'it may be hopeless to try to determine the essence of analytic philosophy.' Nearly every proposed definition has been challenged by some scholar. e are dealing with a family resemblance concept." Insofar as broad generalizations can be made, analytic philosophy is defined by its emphasis on clarity and argument, often achieved via modern formal logic and analysis of language, and a respect for the natural sciences.H. Glock, "Was Wittgenstein an Analytic Philosopher?", Metaphilosophy, 35:4 (2004), pp. 419-444.

The historical roots of analytic philosophy can be summarily characterised thus:

First, the logical positivism view that there are no specifically philosophical truths and that the object of philosophy is the logical clarification of thoughts. This contrasts with the traditional foundationalism, deriving from Aristotle, that views philosophy as a special sort of science, the highest one, which investigates the fundamental reasons and principles of everything.See Aristotle Metaphysics (Book II 993a), Kenny (1973) p. 230. As a result, analytic philosophers have often considered their inquiries as continuous with, or subordinate to, those of the natural sciences.This is an attitude that goes back to John Locke, who described his work as that of an "underlabourer" to the achievements of natural scientists such as Newton. In the twentieth century, the most influential advocate of the continuity of philosophy with science was Willard Van Orman Quine: see, e.g., his papers "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" and "Epistemology Naturalized".

Second, the view that the logical clarification of thoughts can only be achieved by analysis of the logical form of philosophical propositions.A.P. Martinich, "Introduction," in Martinich & D. Sosa (eds.), A Companion to Analytic Philosophy (Blackwell, 2001), p. 1: "To use a general name for the kind of analytic philosophy practiced during the first half of the twentieth century, 'conceptual analysis' aims at breaking down complex concepts into their simpler components." The logical form of a proposition is a way of representing it (often using the formal grammar and symbolism of a logical system) to display its similarity with all other propositions of the same type. However, analytic philosophers disagree widely about the correct logical form of ordinary language.Wittgenstein, op. cit., 4.111

Third, a rejection of sweeping philosophical systems in favour of close attention to detail.Scott Soames, Philosophical Analysis in the Twentieth Century Vol. 1 (Princeton UP, 2003), p. xv: "There is, I think, a widespread presumption within the tradition that it is often possible to make philosophical progress by intensively investigating a small, circumscribed range of philosophical issues while holding broader, systematic questions in abeyance. What distinguishes twentieth-century analytical philosophy from at least some philosophy in other traditions, or at other times, is not a categorical rejection of philosophical systems, but rather the acceptance of a wealth of smaller, more thorough and more rigorous, investigations that need not be tied to any overarching philosophical view." See also, e.g., "Philosophical Analysis" (catalogued under "Analysis, Philosophical") in Encyclopedia of Philosophy , Vol. 1 (Macmillan, 1967), esp. sections on "Bertrand Russell" at p. 97ff, "G.E. Moore" at p. 100ff, and "Logical Positivism" at p. 102ff. Among some (but by no means all) analytic philosophers, this rejection of "grand theory" has taken the form of a defence of common sense and ordinary language against the pretensions of metaphysicians.See, e.g., the works of G.E. Moore and J.L. Austin.

History In the early 20th century, the England philosophers Bertrand Russell and G. E. Moore used conceptual analysis to criticize then-dominant forms of Hegelianism, rejecting its idealism and purported obscurity.See for example Moore's A Defence of Common Sense and Russell's critique of the Doctrine of internal relations"…analytic philosophy opposed right from its beginning English neo-hegelianism of Bradley's sort and similar ones. It did not only criticize the latter's denial of the existence of an external world (anyway an unjust criticism), but also the bombastic, obscure style of Hegel's writings." Peter Jonkers, "Perspectives on twentieth century philosophy: A Reply to Tom Rockmore," Their approach was reinforced by the movement of positivist-inclined continental philosophers into English-speaking countries in the first half of the century.Prominent amongst these were Ludwig Wittgenstein and Rudolf Carnap. Karl Popper might also be included, since despite his rejection of the label his method bears many of the hallmarks of the analytic tradition. Post-World War II analytic philosophy subsequently took various paths, including a rejection of formal analysis in favour of a close examination of natural language,The later Wittgenstein was accompanied on this path by many contemporaries, including J. L. Austin inquiry into the logical underpinnings of languagesWillard Van Orman Quine and Donald Davidson (philosopher) and renewed interest in the ethical implications of analytic method.Many deserve mention here, including the influence of R. M. Hare and Philippa Foot.

The prominence of logic Gottlob Frege and Edmund Husserl were key figures in early twentieth century philosophy of mathematics. Husserl's Philosophy of Arithmetic, inspired by the teachings of Karl Weierstrass, attempted to show that the concept of the cardinal number, derived from psychical acts of grouping objects and counting them, was the foundation of arithmetic. Husserl's approach was strongly condemned as psychologism in a review by Frege, who was committed to the view that mathematics and logic have their own validity, independent of the judgments or mental states of individual mathematicians and logicians. Frege's own work, the Begriffsschrift, developed the concepts of a specific form of modern logic by making use of the notions of the sense and reference. Frege further developed his philosophy of logic and mathematics in The Foundations of Arithmetic and The Basic Laws of Arithmetic where he provides an alternative to psychologistic accounts of the concept of number.

Bertrand Russell and Alfred North Whitehead attempted to show that mathematics is reducible to fundamental logical principles. Their Principia Mathematica (1910-1913) encouraged many philosophers to take a renewed interest in the development of symbolic logic. This contributed in turn to the evolution of logical positivism, which used formal logical tools to underpin an empiricist account of our knowledge of the world. Philosophers such as Rudolf Carnap and Hans Reichenbach, along with other members of the Vienna Circle, held that the truths of logic and mathematics were tautologies, and that tautologies, together with verifiable empirical claims, constituted the entire universe of meaningful judgments; anything else was, strictly speaking nonsense (including, for example, the claims of ethics, aesthetics and theology). Karl Popper's insistence upon the role of falsification in the philosophy of science was a reaction to the logical positivists. ISBN 0-415-27844-9

Formalism and natural languages Part of analytic approach is the clarification of philosophical problems by examining the language used to express them. Two major threads weave through this tradition: formalism and natural language.

The former seeks to understand language, and hence philosophical problems, by making use of logic. That is, in one way or another it seeks to formalize the way in which philosophical statements are made. This perspective has been taken up in a number of formulations, including Symbolic logic, which assumes the primary importance of sense and reference in the construction of meaning, as well as Kurt Gödel Gödel's incompleteness theorem, Bertrand Russell's theory of definite descriptions, Karl Popper's theory of falsificationism and Alfred Tarski's Semantic theory of truth.

A second thread seeks to understand philosophical ideas by a close and careful examination of the natural language used to express them – usually with some emphasis on the importance of common sense in dealing with difficult concepts.

These two threads intertwine, sometimes implacably opposed to each other, sometimes virtually identical. Famously, Wittgenstein started out in the formalism camp, but ended up in the natural language camp.

Formalism Logical atomism Analytic philosophy has its origins in Gottlob Frege’s development of predicate logic. This permitted a much wider range of sentences to be parsed into logical form. Bertrand Russell adopted it as his primary philosophical tool; a tool he thought could expose the underlying structure of philosophical problems. For example, the English word “is” can be parsed in three distinct ways:

in 'the cat is asleep: the is of predication says that 'x is P': P(x)
in 'there is a cat”: the is of existence says that there is an x: ∃(x)
in 'three is half of six': the is of identity says that x is the same as y: x=y

The London Philosophy Study Guide offers many suggestions on what to read, depending on the student's familiarity with the subject: Frege, Russell, and Wittgenstein

External links

Analytic Philosophy; Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Conceptions of Analysis in Analytic Philosophy; Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
European Society for Analytic Philosophy

References

Aristotle, Metaphysics
Geach, P., Mental Acts, London 1957
Kenny, A.J.P., Wittgenstein, London 1973.
Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, article Analytic Philosophy.
Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus

Footnotes

Analytic philosophy, by Roger Jones
Article by Roger Jones on this tradition and its development from Frege to Rorty.

Analytic philosophy - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Analytic philosophy (or analytical philosophy) is a term used in two main senses. First, it can be used to denote a specific movement in early 20th century philosophy, led by ...

Analytic Philosophy [Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy]
The school of analytic philosophy has dominated academic philosophy in various regions, most notably Great Britain and the United States, since the early twentieth century.

Department of Philosophy - DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY - University of ...
Guide to philosophy links and lists from Liverpool University. Includes employment and conference listings.

ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY: BEYOND THE LINGUISTIC TURN AND BACK AGAIN P.M.S ...
29 January 2005 / 1 April 2005 ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY: BEYOND THE LINGUISTIC TURN AND BACK AGAIN P.M.S. Hacker 1. Analytic Philosophy There is extensive controversy over the correct ...

Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy Online
Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy ... Sorry, the page you requested is only available to logged-in subscribers.

Nick Bostrom's thinking in analytic philosophy
The sharpest thinking on the coolest topics ... Nick Bostrom's thinking in analytic philosophy. NOTE: This website has moved to http://www.nickbostrom.com. (Please go there; this ...

Palgrave.com - Philosophy
History of Analytic Philosophy Series Editor: Dr Michael Beaney. About the Series The main aim of this series is to create a venue for work on the history of analytic philosophy ...

Analytic Philosophy at Sussex : Philosophy : University of Sussex
Our department is strong in all areas of analytic philosophy, with particular expertise in the following: Metaphysics: causation, modality, realism and idealism, substance, Kant ...

The birth of analytic philosophy∗ Michael Potter
1 - The birth of analytic philosophy ∗ Michael Potter Analytic philosophy was, at its birth, an attempt to escape from an earlier tradition, that of Kant, and the first ...